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Urban sprawl
Urban sprawl is widely regarded as an important
environmental and social problem, particularly 
in the United States. But much of the debate is based on
speculation: until now, the data to conduct detailed and
systematic measurement of how and where land is
converted to urban use have simply not been 
available. Our research fills that gap by merging high-
altitude photos from 1976 with satellite images from
1992 to create a grid of 8.7 billion 30-metre by 
30-metre cells that tracks the evolution of land 
use across the whole of the continental United States.
These new high-resolution data make it possible 
to observe the amount of open space in the
neighbourhood of every house in every US city. Since
there is more open space around a house that is 
far from its neighbours, development is more scattered as
this quantity of open space increases. Thus, we can
measure urban sprawl by calculating the average amount
of open space in the neighbourhood of a house 
in each city. 
So is urban sprawl really increasing? In fact, we find that
residential development in 1992 is no more scattered than
development was in 1976. The proportion of open space
in the square kilometre of land surrounding the average
residential development was 42% in 1976 compared with
43% in 1992. While a substantial amount of scattered
residential development was built between 1976 and
1992, overall residential development did not become any
more biased towards such sprawling areas.
Of course, any one household might have seen a great
deal of change over this period. But if we zoom out and
look at the city from a distance, we see little change, at
least in terms of the proportions of sprawling and compact
development. The new city is just like an enlarged version
of the old city.
We also investigate why some cities are more sprawling
than others, and find that a city’s climate, topography and
access to groundwater account for 25% of the variation.
For example, when the climate is temperate, people spread
New research by Henry Overman and colleagues provides a
detailed picture of how land is used in US cities – and
challenges conventional wisdom about urban sprawl.
in brief...
Figure 1 (this page):
Urban land and aquifers
in San Antonio and
Austin, Texas
Figure 2 (opposite page):
Urban land and
incorporated places 
in St. Louis, Missouri
0    10    20 Kilometers
0         10        20 Miles
Roads have no impact on sprawl;
climate, topography and access to
groundwater do
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out to have more space to enjoy the weather. Similarly,
hilly places see more scattered development as people
avoid the costs of building on hillsides. But mountains act
as a barrier and lead to more compact development.
Places with easy access to groundwater also see more
scattered development since people can supply remote
houses with water by drilling inexpensive wells rather than
paying for water lines. The presence of aquifers is
particularly important (as illustrated in Figure 1, which
shows the relationship between aquifers and sprawl in San
Antonio and Austin, Texas). This implies that controlling
access to groundwater is a way to control whether
development sprawls or not.
Roads, in contrast, have no impact on development
patterns, despite commonly held beliefs to the contrary.
Taking various measures of road density – miles of road per
area, average distance to a road and distance to an
interstate exit – we find no relationship with the
scatteredness of development. This suggests that the road
network tends to follow development patterns rather than
vice versa.
The number of municipalities in a metropolitan area 
also has no effect on development patterns. But
development near cities is less scattered if it occurs in a
municipality as opposed to an unincorporated area of a
county (as Figure 2 – a map of St. Louis, Missouri –
depicts). This suggests that people may be moving just
beyond municipal boundaries to avoid more stringent
municipal regulations. 
One of the common complaints about urban sprawl is that
as development spreads, municipal services such as roads,
sewers, police and fire protection are more expensive. It
turns out that this concern is well founded. Development
in municipalities that receive larger government subsidies
is, on average, more scattered. This suggests that when
local taxpayers are held accountable for infrastructure
costs, they respond by insisting on patterns of
development that require less infrastructure spending.
Overall, cities are not sprawling
more than they used to: the 
new city is just like an enlarged
version of the old city
This article summarises ‘Causes of
Sprawl: A Portrait from Space’ by Marcy
Burchfield, Henry Overman, Diego Puga
and Matthew Turner, Quarterly Journal
of Economics 121:2 (May 2006).
The photographs are from page 598,
©2006 by the President and Fellows of
Harvard College and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
Marcy Burchfield is at the Neptis
Foundation. Diego Puga and Matthew
Turner are at the University of Toronto.
Henry Overman is a reader in economic
geography at LSE and an associate in
CEP’s globalisation programme.
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A
t the Lisbon summit of
2000, the European
Union (EU) set an
ambitious agenda for
making Europe the
most competitive
economy in the world. Among its many
targets were these for employment and
growth: by 2010, the EU should have
employment rates for the working-age 
(15-64) population as close as possible to
70%, for women at least 60% and for the
55-64 age group 50%; and as the main
driver of growth, spending on research and
development (R&D) should be at least 3%
of GDP, with two thirds or more done by
the private sector.
These targets are unlikely to be
achieved. Progress has been slow and a
comparison between the EU and other
OECD countries shows that although some
countries improved their employment
performance, in the first five years since
Lisbon, no country that was below the
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In a world of rapid technological progress and
increasing international competition, how can
European countries improve their poor employment
performance? Christopher Pissarides argues 
that much needs to change in the lower 
productivity, more labour-intensive service sectors 
of the economy.
What future for
European jobs?
40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
EU-15
EU-new
Other OECD countries
Figure 1:
Employment rates in 1999 and 2004
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Source: OECD Employment Outlook
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70% line in 1999 progressed sufficiently far
towards the line by 2004 (see Figure 1).
What explains this failure? It seems to
me that the central problem is not a lack of
knowledge of what policies can work but
one of implementation. The European
Employment Strategy of 1997 contained
several specific measures designed to
increase job creation. The OECD has
repeatedly emphasised increased flexibility,
adaptability, active labour market measures
for the unemployed and lower taxes, at
least for those at the lower end of the
wage distribution. Similar recommendations
were made by the European Employment
Taskforce, which reported in 2003.
A key part of the problem seems to be
that although the types of policies needed
are universal (they apply to all countries),
the processes needed to implement them
are not. The latter must be decided at the
national level within the context of the
institutions and objectives of the national
government, which is much more difficult.
And there are likely to be objections from
many stakeholders with vested interests in
the status quo.
My objective here is not to look at each
country’s labour market performance and
recommend specific measures for reform.
Instead, I want to look at policies that can,
in principle, be effective in achieving the
overall employment targets set at Lisbon.
The novel feature of my approach is
that it puts policy in the context of the
dynamic evolution of the European
economy in a world of rapid technological
progress and increasing international
competition. We need to understand the
underlying causes of low employment in
Europe in relation to growth and economic
development before a policy prescription
can be made.
The connection between jobs
and growth
The Lisbon agenda emphasises the
‘knowledge economy’, which essentially
means jobs and growth in high-tech
sectors. But much of the job expansion that
is needed to satisfy its targets will be in
labour-intensive sectors of the economy,
which experience low productivity growth.
So job creation is not likely to be the main
contributor to growth.
Indeed, the link runs the other way:
more growth will bring job creation. There
is evidence, for example, that increasing the
growth rate of labour productivity increases
the demand for labour, reduces
unemployment and increases participation.
My research (Pissarides and Vallanti, 2004)
finds that increasing productivity growth by
1 percentage point reduces unemployment
by about 1.3 percentage points. Such
changes in the growth rate in Europe are
feasible given the low starting points.
Of course, high growth is not spread
uniformly across the economy. Some
sectors will inevitably grow faster than
others. And high growth usually does not
create many jobs in the sectors that
experience it: rather, it creates wealth,
which in turn creates demand for 
services elsewhere.
The jobs growth that comes with
productivity growth is more widespread
across the economy than the productivity
growth itself, and usually more heavily
concentrated in low productivity sectors
such as retail trade and medical care. The
people who take these jobs need to be
compensated sufficiently to give them the
incentives to enter employment. High
compensation in the low-growth sectors is
achieved through high prices for their final
products, not through more productive use
of resources. This is why we experience
more price inflation and more job creation
in low-productivity service sectors.
The European jobs deficit
How do we know that most jobs will be
created in low-productivity sectors? First, in
recent European history, employment has
been moving out of agriculture and into
the low-productivity service sectors, with
manufacturing showing either a small fall
or no change. In countries that completed
the transition out of agriculture early, such
as the UK and the United States, the
subsequent transition was mainly out of
manufacturing and again into services.
Importantly, however, although average
hours of work decline with economic
development, there is also pressure in these
countries for an increase in the participation
rates of working-age women, especially
those aged 15-50. So historically, European
countries should expect that given their
small agricultural sectors, there will be
pressures on their manufacturing sectors to
contract, as well as pressures for an
increase in women’s employment rates.
The pressures on manufacturing to
contract are likely to intensify with the
emergence of large Asian manufacturing
producers. Trade and export-led growth can
provide a cushion for manufacturing, as
happened in Japan and Germany in the last
30 years, but it is not likely to continue in
the future. Europe has to face the reality of
the dynamics of the 21st century: most
employment growth is likely to come to
service sectors that do not rely on high-tech
knowledge or trade.
In some ways, this is good news for the
Lisbon employment targets. Economic
forces in Europe should be creating
demand for job creation in sectors of the
Europe’s jobs deficit is 
in sectors that are 
labour-intensive with low
productivity growth
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economy that can easily be met with the
existing stock of human capital. But
creating demand is not equivalent to
creating jobs.
The United States is the most advanced
country in this dynamic economic process.
Its manufacturing sector is shrinking and
service employment is rising; women’s
labour market participation is also rising. As
a result, the main gaps in employment now
between Europe and the United States are
in service employment. Production
industries and agriculture occupy more or
less the same fraction of people. Can
Europe expect a similar dynamic evolution
as the one experienced by the United
States and if so, can it sit back and wait for
natural economic forces to satisfy the
Lisbon targets?
This is a difficult question, but given the
different performance of countries within
Europe, despite their similar level of
economic development, the answer is
probably no, at least in the foreseeable
future. Big gaps remain in employment
between Europe and the United States, and
within Europe, mainly between the north
and the south. These gaps are mainly in
business services (such as finance, retail and
transport) and community services (mainly
in health and education).
Figure 2 shows the gaps in the two
types of services. The main gaps are in
business services, with only the UK
surpassing the United States because of its
large financial sector. But there are also
substantial gaps in community services,
with the exception of the Scandinavian
countries (Sweden and Denmark), which
have many community services supported
mostly by the state.
Figure 3 breaks down the
employment gaps in the business sector.
Here the biggest gaps are in retail and
wholesale trade. The gaps in transport
and communication are relatively small.
There are also gaps in financial services,
mainly in business services connected with
real estate and in the provision of a
variety of other services to employers.The
biggest gaps in financial services are in
the southern European countries. 
Figure 4 shows employment growth in
the business services sector. Over the last
30 years, European countries have been
achieving good rates of growth in finance,
real estate and insurance services, which
include high-tech computing services. But
they have not been able to match the US
rate of growth in the retail and wholesale
trade sector, which is the one of this group
characterised by lower productivity growth.
It is clear that the jobs deficit in Europe
is in sectors that are labour-intensive with
low productivity growth. Europe has been
creating jobs in the knowledge economy at
a comparable scale to the United States,
although it has not substantially closed the
gap yet. But the low-growth sectors in the
United States attract big numbers of
workers, especially women, which are not
matched in Europe.
Compensation in these jobs is good in
the United States because the prices of
their final products are relatively high. The
fact that consumers can afford to pay the
high prices is itself the result of more
-5%
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Figure 2:
The employment gap in business and community
services between the United States and EU countries
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Figure 3:
The employment gap in business services sectors
between the United States and EU countries
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employment. When women leave the
home to take employment, they create
demand for market services such as
cleaning, food preparation and childcare,
which creates more jobs for others.
Why are European
economies not creating so
many jobs?
The same pressures for an increase in the
consumption of business and community
services are present in Europe. Europe has
more or less caught up with the United
States in productivity per hour, but
because Americans work more hours,
income per head is higher.
But do Americans really work more
hours than Europeans? Americans work
more hours in the market and so create
more jobs, but they work fewer hours at
home. Recent research (Freeman and
Schettkat, 2005) on the hours worked by
Americans and Europeans concludes that
they work approximately the same
number of hours, but Europeans work
much more in the home than Americans
(see Table 1). The difference between
market and home allocation is particularly
marked for women.
European women work on average 8
hours less than American women in the
market, but they work 10 hours more in
the home. They do more house
maintenance, they cook more at home
and they look after relatives. They are
engaged in ‘home production’, something
Americans do much less.
The Lisbon targets imply that
Europeans should move to the market by
‘marketising’ their home production. It is,
of course, debatable whether this is a
good policy to encourage, but how could
it be done?
The natural conclusion is that to
increase employment in Europe, we need
to make the market more accessible to
women, who now shy away from market
work, and we need to create good jobs
in labour-intensive sectors of the
economy. It is interesting, and
encouraging for Europe, that the 
sectors that lag behind the United States
in job creation are women-friendly
sectors: retailing, restaurants and hotels,
and community services such as childcare
and nursing care. Men need not be
displaced from their current jobs to make
room for women.
An explanation why the market
pressures that have given rise to more
employment in the United States have not
had the same impact in Europe runs as
follows. Consumers work out the relative
cost of buying some services in the
market versus providing them at home.
When the price of market goods relative
to per capita incomes is lower, more
households will choose to use the market
for services that have close substitutes in
the home. So to understand why
Europeans use the market less than
Americans, we need to look at the factors
that influence the relative costs of buying
in the market versus producing at home.
There cannot be large differences in
the cost of producing services at home in
Europe and the United States. Consumer
durables are widely available and homes
are as well equipped in Europe as they are
in the United States. The factors that can
explain the differences in employment
patterns in Europe and the United States
must therefore be in the returns to
market work and in the cost of buying
services from the market. The
interpretation of these costs must be
general, to include convenience factors
and not only prices and wages.
Several factors are contributing to
making the products of market work in
Europe too expensive for consumers and
market work itself unattractive for
workers. And the two issues are, of
course, interconnected: if there are
features that make market work
unattractive, they could be offset 
by higher prices for the final product; 
but higher prices would then choke off
demand and so reduce employment.
-0.5
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Figure 4:
Average annual change in employment rate in
business services sectors, 1970-2004
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Table 1:
Weekly hours of work of men and women aged 25-54 in the
United States and Europe in the early 1990s
Men Women
Market Home Total Market Home Total
United States 44.1 16.1 60.2 28.7 30.1 58.8
European Union 43.4 13.6 57.0 20.7 40.5 61.2
Source: Freeman and Schettkat (2005)
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What can make market work
more attractive?
So the key question is what can make
market work more attractive, especially to
women? First, there are various restrictions
on market work, which, although
individually seemingly unimportant, when
aggregated they add up to a lot. These
include flexibility in market work hours,
flexibility in shop opening times, and the
availability of inexpensive childcare services
(see Freeman and Schettkat, 2005). These
types of facilities make it easier for women
with children, and for those without
children who have a household to run, to
enter employment.
Examples of European countries that
have liberalised restrictions and succeeded
in increasing women’s employment to the
Lisbon targets, include the Netherlands and
the UK. Both countries have very large
numbers of part-time jobs and, in the UK
at least, evenings and weekends are the
busiest times in the shops. The
Scandinavian countries have also
succeeded in raising women’s employment.
A factor here is not just widely available
childcare, but also the fact that many of
the community services marketised in the
United States are provided by the state,
which employs large numbers of women.
Another important factor in the
employment of women is education.
Employment differentials across countries
are lower at higher educational
attainments. Women with university
degrees have similar rates of employment
everywhere. Of course, it would take a
long time for substantially more women to
acquire university degrees and gain
employment. But the impact of higher
education on women’s employment is not
one-for-one. When more women acquire
education and gain employment, they
create demand for the services of other
women with less education. There is a
‘multiplier’ effect of education, which
brings to the market a larger number of
women than the ones leaving college with
higher qualifications.
The initiative to increase education in
Europe comes from the state. But for it to
be effective, two pre-conditions need to be
satisfied. First, women need to know that
jobs will be available and that they would
be compensated as well as men’s jobs.
There is EU legislation against
discrimination, but it is not always
effectively implemented (see Boeri et al,
2005). Increasing the effectiveness of
legislation and making working conditions
good for women will certainly improve the
chances of satisfying the Lisbon targets. In
the United States, there has been high-
profile anti-discrimination legislation since
the early 1970s and it has contributed to
the expansion of women’s employment.
The second pre-condition is that highly
qualified women need to know that there
will be less qualified people around, mainly
women, prepared to do the tasks normally
done in the home. This is where childcare
services are vital, but equally important
(because they affect larger numbers of
women) is the availability of people
prepared to work as cleaners and in
restaurants and laundries.
To achieve this, the EU needs to think
seriously about unskilled migration and its
potential contribution to the Lisbon
agenda. In Cyprus, for example,
employment levels are within the Lisbon
targets. Educational levels and women’s
employment rates are unusually high for a
Mediterranean country. These rates are
supported by large numbers of unskilled
immigrants on regulated fixed-term
contracts, working in business and
community services, mostly domestic
service, nursing and retailing.
Making it easier for
employers
Job creation needs to be attractive to
potential employers too. An obvious policy
reform here is that labour markets should
be liberalised, especially at the lower end
of the skills distribution. This is not new: it
has been emphasised in numerous writings
by the OECD and the European
Commission. But reforms have not been
forthcoming.
The administrative burden on
companies, especially new, smaller
companies, certainly explains some of the
gaps in service jobs. Jobs in business and
community services are frequently
performed within small companies or by
individuals working on their own account.
If these individuals are to be attracted to
the market, it is important that setting up
a small company and running it should be
easy and inexpensive.
For example, there should be one
window for completing all the necessary
administrative work for a new company,
setting it up should be completed within a
week and the company should not be
required to report detailed accounts and
register for VAT if turnover is expected to
be below a certain (generous) limit. Direct
assistance from the state for new
entrepreneurs is also important.
A study of the French retail sector
(Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002) finds that
barriers to the setting up of supermarkets
have a negative impact on the local labour
market. And other studies find that
unimpeded entrepreneurship helps in both
the diffusion of new technologies and the
adaptation of businesses to new
challenges. Diffusion and adaptability are
important for Europe in a world with the
twin challenges of technological catch-up
with the United States and globalisation.
Indeed, with these two challenges,
adaptability is more important than R&D
geared to new discoveries.
Another obvious factor in the
attractiveness of job creation that has
attracted a lot of attention recently is
taxation, which can discourage both
employers and employees. This follows
Edward Prescott’s claim that the entire gap
between European and American hours of
work can be explained by taxation, which
makes work in the home relatively more
attractive because it is not taxed.
Econometric evidence has so far failed
to find a large impact of taxation on
employment, and Prescott’s work has been
criticised for failing to distinguish between
different types of taxation and the uses to
which the tax revenue is put, which must
influence the impact that taxation has on
employment. Nevertheless, taxation clearly
has a bigger impact on economic activity
at the lower end of the productivity
distribution. Profit margins and net gains
from employment are smaller when
productivity is lower so a given tax takes a
bigger proportional slice of net gain.
It is now widely accepted that capital
should not be taxed much because it is
mobile: if one country taxes it, capital will
flee to another. The experience with home
and market work in Europe shows that
low-wage labour is also mobile, between
the home and the market. Based on the
Effective labour market
reforms include more
flexible employment 
and lower taxation of
low-wage jobs 
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same principle, low-wage market work
should not be taxed much either.
Otherwise, it will flee to the home.
What can the European
Commission do?
The most important reforms needed to
achieve the Lisbon targets are at the
national level. Not all EU countries need
the same reforms and it is up to individual
governments to decide what is most
urgent for their situation. But can the
Commission help in any way other than
giving advice and exerting moral pressure?
The answer is yes – and although
much has been done, much remains to do.
The report of Wim Kok’s group (European
Commission, 2004) highlights five areas of
policy that require urgent action. Four of
them are firmly in the national domain:
encouraging R&D; improving the business
climate; improving the performance of the
labour market; and ensuring environmental
sustainability. But the fifth – the
completion of the single market – mainly
requires action from European institutions.
Market integration is important
because European companies can take
advantage of economies of scale. Prices of
goods are generally lower in the United
States than in Europe and the reason is
that US companies have better distribution
networks and make better use of
diversified locations within the United
States. Europe can do the same, but it is
not doing it yet.
The main benefits from European
integration so far have been the benefits
from free trade. The Commission estimates
that in the first 10 years of the single
market, European GDP gained about
1.5%. This is not very much compared
with the annual rate of growth of GDP,
corresponding to about a year’s growth.
There have also been some gains in job
creation but with respect to services, the
biggest component of GDP, integration has
not yet taken place.
The Kok report rightly emphasises that
efforts towards completing the single
market should be stepped up, especially in
the liberalisation of services. Even financial
services are not fully integrated, although
there is an agreement that they should be.
On paper, integration is complete in the
goods sector, but the large differences in
prices that remain across Europe are
evidence that it has not yet fully taken
place. The limits here may be due to
corporate policies and not a matter of
national policies. If that is the case, the
Commission can again take action to
improve integration.
Beyond this channel, the Commission
has mainly emphasised the need for reform
and more effort to achieve the Lisbon
targets. But it has not taken concrete
action. The failure to take the necessary
action at the national level is partly the
result of countries not doing what they
said they would do, and partly not saying
or doing what is needed.
The Commission could work out a
system or incentives to make countries
more willing to take on the necessary
measures. For example, it could give some
financial compensation for research and
other spending that is now financed by
national budgets but which contributes to
the Lisbon targets. Financial aid or
incentives have not been tied closely to the
targets. If the Commission wishes to
accelerate the reform process, this is one
area in which it could contribute a lot.
Conclusions
■ The job creation required to achieve the
Lisbon targets will be mainly in sectors
with low productivity growth: retail
trade, a variety of business services and
community services.
■ European countries have been successful
at creating jobs in the ‘knowledge
sectors’, such as financial services, but
have been unsuccessful at creating them
in the more labour-intensive service
sectors.
■ Most new employment will come from
women now outside the labour force
and it will ‘marketise’ many of the
services now done in the home, such as
childcare and other personal care,
cleaning, shopping, etc.
■ To achieve the new job creation,
employment needs to be made more
women-friendly through more flexibility
of working hours, more flexibility in
shop opening hours and easier
availability of domestic service.
■ Education needs to be further advanced
and supported by less expensive
immigrant labour in the labour-intensive
service sectors, including the home.
■ Other essential labour market reforms
include an increase in the flexibility of
employment, less taxation of low-wage
jobs and fewer administrative burdens
on new entrepreneurs.
■ Finally, the failures of the Lisbon agenda
are not due to a lack of knowledge of
the principles behind the right policies
but a lack of urgency in the reform and
implementation process needed to put
those principles into practice.
This is an edited version of the keynote
address by Christopher Pissarides delivered
at the Austrian Presidency conference on
Innovations in Labour Market Policies:
Challenges in Times of Globalisation, Vienna,
16-17 February 2006. Pissarides is professor
of economics at LSE and director of CEP’s
research programme on macroeconomics.
Further reading
Marianne Bertrand and Francis Kramarz
(2002), ‘Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job
Creation? Evidence from the French Retail
Industry’, Quarterly Journal of Economics
117, 1369-413.
Tito Boeri, Daniela Del Boca and Christopher
Pissarides (eds) (2005), Women at Work: An
Economic Perspective, Oxford University
Press.
European Commission (2004), Facing the
Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth
and Employment, report from the high level
group chaired by Wim Kok.
Richard Freeman and Ronald Schettkat
(2005), ‘Marketization of Household
Production and the EU-US Gap in Work’,
Economic Policy 41, 6-50.
Christopher Pissarides and Giovanna Vallanti
(2005), ‘The Impact of TFP Growth on
Steady-state Unemployment’, Centre for
Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper
No. 5002.
Edward Prescott (2004), ‘Why Do Americans
Work So Much More than Europeans?’,
Quarterly Review of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, July, 2-13.
The central problem is
not a lack of knowledge
of what policies will
create jobs but one of
implementation
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T
he view that information and
communication technology
(ICT) is a useful tool for raising
educational standards dates
back to the 1950s and the findings of
Harvard psychologist BF Skinner. More
recently, support for the effectiveness of ICT
as a teaching and learning device has come
from the educational and psychological
literature (recently reviewed by Heather
Kirkpatrick and Larry Cuban), which tends
to make enthusiastic claims for the value of
new technology in schools.
Economists have generally been much
more cautious, in particular raising concerns
about the methodological validity of much
of this research. Most of the positive
findings are inferred from simple
correlations between ICT and test scores.
These cannot take account of unobserved
school characteristics – such as more
motivated teachers – that may lead to both
ICT adoption and better attainments.
Indeed, starting with work by Joshua
Angrist and Victor Lavy, a small number of
economic studies, applying more rigorous
methods of analysis, have found it hard to
uncover any evidence of a positive causal
relationship between computers (and/or
computer software) and pupil performance.
This has not stopped the UK
government seeing ICT investment in
schools as ‘crucial to our drive to raise
standards’ (former secretary of state for
education Ruth Kelly) and envisaging ICT
being widely used across the whole
curriculum in all state schools (see
Department for Education and Skills (DfES),
2003, and Office for Standards in
Education (Ofsted), 2001).
The positive rhetoric has been backed
up by considerable public investment.
Between 1998 and 2002, ICT expenditure
almost doubled in English secondary
schools – from an average of £40,100 to
just under £75,300 per school, or 3% of
overall expenditure – and more than trebled
in primary schools – from £3,600 in 1998
New technology in schools:
is there a payoff?
Economists have typically been sceptical that computers improve
educational outcomes. But research by Stephen Machin, Sandra
McNally and Olmo Silva finds evidence that new technology can
have a positive effect on pupils’ performance.
Table 1:
How was ICT money spent in schools?
Percentage devoted to different items
1999/00 2001/02 Percentage 
Primary schools change
Hardware 63 53 -16
Software 10 10 0
Internet 8 7 -12
Training 7 11 +57
Technical support 9 13 +44
Administration + other 3 6 +100
Total expenditure per school £10,000 £14,100 +41
Secondary schools
Hardware 57 55 -3.5
Software 9 9 0
Internet 4 3 -25
Training 4 6 +50
Technical support 14 17 +21
Administration + other 12 10 -17
Total expenditure per school £56,500 £76,000 +34.5
Source: Authors’ calculations from ICT Survey of Schools in England (DfES)
Large increases in ICT funding 
have improved educational
performance in primary schools
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to £12,900 in 2002, or 2% of overall
expenditure. Most of this dramatic
acceleration took place from 2000 and the
upward trend continued in 2003 and 2004.
Table 1 shows how primary and
secondary schools used these resources in
2000 and 2002. Between these years, the
share of ICT expenditure devoted to
hardware and software actually decreased –
by 16% in primary schools and 3.5% in
secondary schools – but as the total
amount of ICT funding was increasing,
overall expenditure in these two categories
grew steadily.
Interestingly, the share of resources
devoted to teacher training rose by 57%
for primary schools and 50% for secondary
schools between 2000 and 2002. This
suggests that the extra funding may have
improved the quality of ICT use in schools,
not simply increasing the quantity of 
ICT equipment. 
Table 2 provides a more complete
picture of schools’ ICT use, showing how
new technology and training grew in
response to the extra resources. Although
schools were already well resourced, there
were quite sizeable changes between 2000
and 2003. For example, the pupils to
computer ratio in 2000 was 10 to 1 in
primary schools and 7 to 1 in secondary
schools; by 2003, the respective ratios were
6 to 1 and 4 to 1.
The indicators of ICT use in the
classroom also show fairly high percentage
increases over this short time period. What’s
more, the fraction of teachers trained to
use ICT grew substantially. This confirms
our intuition that rather than just increasing
the quantity of ICT equipment, schools also
invested in the quality of ICT use.
Although secondary schools were
better equipped with ICT in 2000, the
greatest relative increase over time was
experienced in primary schools. It is also
notable that ICT is used regularly for
teaching purposes in a much higher
percentage of primary schools than
secondary schools. Any effect of ICT on
educational performance is therefore likely
to be more evident in primary schools than
secondary schools.
We also have evidence that ICT is
widely used in primary schools to teach
English: 65% of primary schools report that
they ‘substantially use’ ICT for teaching this
subject. The next most important ‘ICT user’
is Mathematics, where ICT is ‘substantially
used’ in about 56% of primary schools,
followed by Science (35%).
So has the big increase in ICT
investment made a difference to
educational standards? Our research
evaluates whether changes in ICT
investment had any causal impact on
changes in educational outcomes in English
schools between 1999 and 2003. To do
this, we rely mainly on administrative data
at the level of local education authorities
(LEAs), focusing on average achievements
at the end of primary education in English,
Mathematics and Science. Following DfES
targets, we look at the proportion of pupils
achieving level 4 or above in the three
subjects at age 11, the end of Key Stage 2.
Inferring a causal relationship between
ICT investments and pupil achievements
from simple correlations can be misleading.
For example, we could imagine that schools
or LEAs with more motivated teachers and
head teachers are both more likely to adopt
ICT and to produce better attainments:
then, if we did not control for motivations,
and just related ICT use to pupil tests, a
positive relationship may emerge just
because of this unobserved common factor
(motivation) driving both observed
outcomes.
To overcome this problem and identify
the causal impact of ICT use on pupil
achievement, we exploit a 2001 policy
change that modified the rules for ICT
investment in different regions of England.
Table 2:
Trends in ICT expenditure and use of ICT resources 
Primary schools Secondary schools
1999/00 2002/03 Percentage 1999/00 2002/03 Percentage 
change change
Computers per pupil 0.10 0.16 +60 0.15 0.23 +53
Percentage of teachers using ICT regularly 75 92 +23 38 55 +45
Percentage of teachers trained to use ICT 81 95 +17 75 83 +11
Percentage of teachers with recently updated training 57 85 +49 48 69 +44
Percentage of schools connected to the internet 86 100 +16 99 100 +1
Source: Authors’ calculations from ICT Survey of Schools in England (DfES)
The positive impact of
ICT investment is most
evident in the teaching
of English 
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Before 2001, funding was allocated from
central government to LEAs through a
bidding process, aiming to direct money
towards LEAs with innovative and
interesting proposals for the use of 
ICT funds.
From 2001 onwards, allocations were
instead made according to a formula based
on school and pupil numbers in LEAs with
an adjustment for population density. The
change in the allocation mechanism
created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ among LEAs:
areas that had benefited a lot under the old
system stood to lose from the transition to
a formula-based system, and vice versa. 
In our analysis, we argue (and provide
evidence) that money was reshuffled across
LEAs in a ‘random’ way, that is, in a way
unrelated to unobservable LEA
characteristics that may give rise to a
spurious relationship between ICT funding
and test scores. We then use the changes
in the ICT funding accruing to LEAs to
estimate the effects of ICT expenditure on
educational standards. Our approach
identifies the effect of being a winner or a
loser in the new system of ICT allocation. 
We estimate the effect of changes in
ICT funding per pupil on changes in
achievements in English, Mathematics and
Science at the end of primary education.
We find a positive relationship between ICT
funding per pupil and performance in
English: a doubling of ICT funding per pupil
in schools leads to a 2 percentage point
increase in the proportion of pupils
achieving level 4 or above at age 11.
Changes in ICT funding of this
magnitude really did happen for primary
schools over this period, and the impact on
performance in English is notable given that
the average growth rate of pupils' scores in
this subject was around 7% between 1999
and 2003. But it is important to note that
this causal effect of ICT is not an average
effect for all schools in England. Rather, it is
the causal effect of large changes in ICT
investment for LEAs that were substantially
affected by the rule change – the winners.
For Mathematics, the impact of ICT on
test scores is very close to zero. But there is
a positive relationship between ICT and
achievements in Science: in this case, 
a doubling of ICT funding per pupil leads 
to an increase of 1.6 percentage points in
the proportion of pupils achieving level 4 
or above.
So, unlike previous economic studies,
we find evidence for a positive causal
impact of ICT investment on educational
performance in primary schools. This is
most evident in the teaching of English,
where we also find high use of ICT for
teaching purposes. We also observe a
positive impact for Science, though not for
Mathematics. How can we reconcile our
evidence with previous research that finds
no effect? 
Our estimates identify the impact of
being a winner or a loser under the new
system. After the policy change, the
average growth rate of ICT funds among
LEAs mostly benefiting from the reform
was roughly 60%. This contrasts with a
much smaller change of 20% for LEAs that
lost more from the introduction of the
formula-based system. Intuitively, it is the
comparison between these two groups that
drives our identification of the impact of
ICT on educational outcomes: our strategy
mainly captures the impact of large
changes in ICT investment on primary
school performance. 
LEAs benefiting most from the policy
change were LEAs with lower overall
expenditure per pupil but better
educational standards (as measured by
exam pass rates and truancy rates). This
suggests that resources were redirected to
areas that were in a better position to use
them efficiently. Furthermore, new
technology was already in place in English
schools since the mid-1990s, and money
redirected after the policy change was
mainly spent in updating resources and
teachers’ skills.
So it appears to be the joint effect of
large increases in ICT funding – and a fertile
background for making efficient use of it –
that led to the positive effects of ICT
expenditure on educational performance.
This article summarises ‘New Technology in
Schools: Is There a Payoff?’ by Stephen
Machin, Sandra McNally and Olmo Silva,
Discussion Paper No. 55 from the Centre for
the Economics of Education at CEP
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/cee%20dps/ceedp55.pdf).
The authors are all CEE researchers and
active members of CEP’s wider research
programme on education and skills.
Further reading
Joshua Angrist and Victor Lavy (2002), ‘New
Evidence on Classroom Computers and Pupil
Learning’, Economic Journal 112, 735-65.
Department for Education and Skills (2003),
Fulfilling the Potential: Transforming Teaching
and Learning through ICT in Schools.
Heather Kirkpatrick and Larry Cuban (1998),
‘Computers Make Kids Smarter – Right?’,
TECHNOS Quarterly for Education and
Technology 7(2), 1-11.
Office for Standards in Education (2001), ICT
in Schools: The Impact of Government
Initiatives: An Interim Report.
BF Skinner (1954), ‘The Science of Learning
and the Art of Teaching’, Harvard Educational
Review 24, 86-97.
BF Skinner (1958), ‘Teaching Machines’,
Science 128, 969-77.
Schools have invested not just in
more ICT equipment but also,
through teacher training, in better
quality ICT use
T
he pay gap between
men and women has
fallen quite
dramatically over the
past 30 years though
a sizeable gap still
remains. But this
headline figure masks some less positive
developments in recent years. We are used
to each generation of women making
progress relative to the one before. But this
process has slowed substantially with the
current generation doing only slightly better
than the previous one.
Figure 1 shows how the gender pay
gap has evolved over the lifecycle of four
generations of women – from those born
in 1945-54 to those born in 1975-84. For
all four generations, the gender pay gap
starts off low (or even negative) and then
rises before falling somewhat for older
workers.
Each generation of women has done
better relative to men than the previous
generation, but the pace of improvement
has slowed. For example, women born in
1965-74 have a gender pay gap 8
percentage points below those born in
1955-64. But the generation born in 1975-
84 is only doing 2 percentage points better
than women born in 1965-74. As the
gender pay gap at the age of 30 is about
20%, this suggests it will take 150 years at
the present rate of progress for this gap to
disappear!
It is very likely that the headline gender
pay gap will continue to fall quite
substantially for several years as women
retiring from the labour market (currently
those born in the 1940s) will have much
higher gender pay gaps than new entrants.
But that change is more the product of
discrimination 30 or 40 years ago than
what is happening now. 
The slowing progress 
of women 
So why has the progress of women
slowed? There are two main explanations.
First, discrimination against women used to
be blatant whereas it is now more subtle.
Half a century ago, many employers
operated a marriage bar preventing women
from working once they were married.
Before the 1970 Equal Pay Act, it was
routine for collective agreements to have
women’s pay rates below those of men.
The abolition of such discriminatory
practices had a big effect on the gender
pay gap. But it is much harder now to find
practices that have such a large effect and
can be directly influenced by policy.
The second explanation for slowing
progress is revealed in Figure 2, which
shows the gender gap in employment rates
for the same four generations of women in
Figure 1. The generation born in 1965-74
had much higher levels of labour market
attachment than previous generations. But
the most recent generation of women –
those born in 1975-84 – does not have any
stronger attachment to the labour market
than the previous generation.
Although the gender gap in
employment rates for the 1975-84
generation is small among young workers,
it still grows fast. By the age of 30, the
employment rate of men is still 20
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Figure 1:
The gender pay gap and the lifecycle for 
different birth cohorts
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The gender pay gap
In its recent report on how to make further progress in closing the gender
pay gap, the Women and Work Commission emphasises policy
interventions before women enter the labour market. Alan Manning is
sceptical about their likely effectiveness.
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available to those who want to work
part-time, extending the right to request
flexible working and helping women
returning to the labour market with job
search and skill acquisition.
What is different about these
recommendations is the emphasis on
action before or soon after entry into the
labour market. This contrasts with the
general thrust of policy over the past 30
years to reduce women’s disadvantage at
work – including the Equal Pay Act, the
1975 Sex Discrimination Act, stronger
maternity rights and rights for part-time
workers and the right to request flexible
working – all of which have aimed to
reduce inequalities within the labour
market.
But is the Commission right to
conclude that action is now needed before
women enter the labour market? The
evidence of my research suggests we
should be sceptical.
The gender pay gap among
young workers
Figure 1’s depiction of how the gender pay
gap changes over the lifecycle does not
suggest that the biggest problem is on
labour market entry as the gap is very small
among young workers. The Commission is
right that there is occupational segregation
even among young workers – the jobs
done by young men and women are very
different. But the fact that there is only a
small pay gap at this time suggests that
women are not choosing occupations that
put them at a big immediate disadvantage. 
As an indication of the magnitudes
involved, consider university graduates.
Men and women continue to study very
different subjects at university and this is
reflected in their occupations when they
graduate and enter the labour market. On
graduation, there is currently a small
gender pay gap of about 2.5%, all of
which can be explained by the different
subjects men and women study. So
eliminating this gender difference might be
expected to reduce the gender pay gap by
2.5%. But when the gender pay gap is
25% by the age of 35, this is a non-trivial
but small amount. 
From this, one might be inclined to
dismiss the Commission’s argument that we
need to pay more attention to what
happens prior to labour market entry. But
perhaps things are more subtle than that;
perhaps women are choosing occupations
that offer relatively good wages initially but
little prospect for wage growth. The
evidence here is less clear. There is some
evidence that the subjects studied by
women offer lower wage growth than
those studied by men but again, the
contribution of this seems to be quite small.
One might also argue that policy
should not necessarily be directed where
the problems are greatest but where the
policy will have the most effect. But many
of the Commission’s proposals are for
policies about whose effectiveness we have
absolutely no evidence. In some cases, we
probably never will.
For example, one recommendation is to
percentage points higher than that of
women. The reason is that most women
still take some time out of paid
employment when they have children.
The Women and Work
Commission
These facts are the backdrop to the
Women and Work Commission,
established in 2004 to address the causes
of the gender pay gap and recommend
what to do about it. The Commission’s
report, published in February 2006,
presented what it described as ‘a radical
programme to end decades of jobs and
pay unfairness for women’. It concluded
that women are not making full use of
their skills and the primary cause is the
culture of schools and workplaces.
The report makes 40 detailed
suggestions for tackling the problem. Very
crudely, these proposals are of two kinds:
■ Policies for before (or very soon after)
labour market entry, including reducing
gender stereotyping in schools and
encouraging women to study male-
dominated subjects and undertake
vocational training in male-dominated
occupations. The intended aim here is to
reduce occupational segregation among
young men and women entering the
labour market.
■ Policies for after labour market entry,
including making more senior jobs
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Figure 2:
The gender gap in employment and the lifecycle for 
different birth cohorts
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The current generation 
of working women is 
doing only slightly better
relative to men than the
previous generation
they are continuing to choose family over
career at some point in their life.
What’s more, when they return to the
labour market, they often work part-time.
Our labour market severely punishes those
who at any point in their lives sacrifice
career for family. So people returning 
to part-time work often do so in lower-
status jobs than they had previously. Very
few high-level jobs are done on a part-time
basis.
The Women and Work Commission is
right to recommend that more should be
done to open up high-level jobs to flexible
working arrangements. But it is not very
specific about what should be done.
For example, my research with Barbara
Petrongolo finds little evidence that the right
to request flexible working has had any
impact on the incidence of the whole range
of flexible working practices. It is likely that
people will always pay some price for taking
periods out of paid employment as
experience is valuable to employers. But the
price currently paid by women who take
career breaks does seem to be
disproportionate.
Why women don’t ‘get on’ in
the labour market
While career breaks clearly have an impact,
my research with Joanna Swaffield finds that
most of the gender gap in wage growth
among young workers cannot be explained
by differences in labour market attachment.
For example, we estimate that a woman
who has worked full-time ever since leaving
full-time education can still expect to be
paid 12% less than an equivalent man after
10 years. For some reason, women are
failing to ‘get on’.
One way of seeing this is in the evidence
that women are much less likely to become
managers. Figure 4 shows the percentage of
men and women of different ages who are
in managerial occupations. A gap begins to
open up when people are in their mid-
twenties but then widens very dramatically
after the late twenties. This is what is
commonly understood as the ‘glass ceiling’.
Why do women fail to ‘get on’ in the
labour market? Some recent research 
train early years childcare workers to ensure
that 3-5 year olds do not have their
horizons limited by gender stereotyping. If
implemented, this could only have an effect
20 years down the line. Even then, we
would probably be unable to see its effect
very directly.
There have clearly been huge changes
in attitudes about the role of women and
men in society in the last 50 years. But
government has primarily reflected not
initiated these changes. It may be that
policies like teaching maths and science to
girls in single-sex classes is effective, but I
doubt if the gender pay gap will fall by
much as a result. 
The gender pay gap after
labour market entry 
The evidence in Figure 1 shows that the
gender pay gap is small on labour market
entry but then widens quite rapidly. This
suggests that what happens in the labour
market is much more important than what
happens before entry. That is why my
research with Joanna Swaffield tried to
understand gender differences in wage
growth among young workers. This
widening gap after entry is true whether
one looks at the pay gap or some other
measures of differences between men 
and women. 
For example, Figure 3 shows how
occupational segregation evolves over the
lifecycle. The measure of occupational
segregation here is the Duncan Dissimilarity
Index, which calculates the fraction of men
and women that would have to change
jobs for the proportion of women to be
the same in all jobs. Clearly, there is
occupational segregation on labour market
entry as emphasised by the Commission.
But occupational segregation also grows
very sharply until the age of 35. 
So an awful lot is happening after
labour market entry – what are the reasons
for this divergence? Joanna Swaffield and I
conclude that approximately half of the
rise in the gender pay gap is the result of
differences in the labour market
attachment of women (indicated in Figure
2) and differences in the receipt of
training. 
The main cause of this is that many
women continue to take breaks from paid
employment when they have children. The
problem is not that women are choosing
one career – such as hairdressing – rather
than another – such as plumbing. It is that
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Occupational segregation and the lifecycle
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The gender pay gap is 
small when women
enter the labour
market but then
widens quite rapidly
(see Babcock and Laschever) suggests that
systematic differences in personality are
responsible – for example, that women are
intrinsically less competitive than men, tend
to be less self-confident and less effective in
negotiation. This might be because of
intrinsic differences between men and
women or because of gender stereotyping
within the education system.
Joanna Swaffield and I find that this
has little explanatory power. It is true that
adolescent women have less self-
confidence than men and that the self-
confident do significantly better in the
labour market in later life. But the 
effects we uncover are simply too small to
be an explanation.
There is still considerable mystery
surrounding why women do not make as
much progress as men in the labour
market. And without a clear understanding
of the reasons, it is hard to make
recommendations on policy.
Equal pay audits
As we need to know a lot more about why
the gender gap persists, one policy idea is
to try to force information out into the
open through the use of equal pay audits.
It is quite likely that without any conscious
policy, the promotion decisions in millions
of companies add up to a big disadvantage
for women.
Employers are very often shocked to
discover the size of this disadvantage as
they think of their policies as non-
discriminatory. If statistics were published
on the position of women within firms, this
would bring the position out into the open
and we would expect women themselves
to gravitate to firms where they appear to
do better.
Should such a scheme be compulsory
or voluntary? Employers do not have a
fantastic track record in supporting equal
pay measures that few would now oppose:
many predecessors of today’s executives
justified the marriage bar and opposed the
Equal Pay Act as being ‘bad for business’.
But compulsion is perhaps too far: if we
set up a scheme that encourages employers
to publish statistics on the position of
women in their organisation and perhaps
gives a stamp of approval to those who do
well, then people can draw their own
conclusions about the firms that choose not
to publish such information.
Conclusion
There is much that is sensible in the
recommendations of the Women and Work
Commission’s report. But I am a little
sceptical about how effective their
recommendations are likely to be for the
simple reason that it is now not so easy to
identify the remaining causes of the gender
pay gap.
And I have one concern that the
Commission may make things worse. The
dominant impression from the report is that
women are not making full use of their
skills and this is bad for the economy as a
whole. In phrasing things in these terms,
there is a danger of setting ‘market work’
up as the ideal, reinforcing our culture that
says that rewards should go
disproportionately to those who work hard,
a culture that continues to be to the
advantage of men rather than women.
Every time I sit in my garden enjoying
the sunshine and ‘doing nothing’, I am not
making full use of my skills and ‘UK plc’
suffers as a result. But I choose to do this
because that is what I prefer. In making
that decision, I am probably making a small
sacrifice in career terms, but career is not
everything.
Perhaps the biggest culture change we
need is not in the attitudes and aspirations
of women but those of men. It is not
more women truck drivers that we need
but more male homemakers. On the
problem of men, the Women and Work
Commission is largely silent.
Alan Manning is professor of economics at
LSE and director of CEP’s research
programme on labour markets.
Further reading
Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever (2003),
Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the
Gender Divide, Princeton University Press.
Alan Manning and Barbara Petrongolo (2005),
‘The Part-time Pay Penalty’, CEP Discussion
Paper No. 679
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0679.pdf).
Alan Manning and Joanna Swaffield (2005),
‘The Gender Gap in Early Career Wage
Growth’, CEP Discussion Paper No. 700
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0700.pdf).
The Women and Work Commission (2006),
Shaping a Fairer Future
(http://www.womenandequalityunit.gov.uk/
women_work_commission/).
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S
ince December 2003, UK
law has protected lesbian,
gay and bisexual workers
from discrimination and
harassment at the
workplace, giving them
the same employment rights as women,
disabled and ethnic minority staff. Our
research contributes to the small but
growing literature on the economics of
discrimination according to sexual
orientation by presenting the first
assessment of the impact of this
legislation.
As yet, economists are uncertain how
readily their models of discrimination by
gender and ethnic origin apply to
discrimination by sexual orientation. As
with religion or political affiliation, firms
may not directly observe the sexuality of
workers. And both the type and extent of
any discrimination by sexual orientation
may be different from discrimination by
gender or ethnic origin.
The likelihood of an employer, co-
worker or customer discriminating against
a gay person could also vary with
characteristics such as age, education and
the nature and location of the workplace.
Equal opportunity policies, for example,
were typically adopted earlier in the UK’s
public sector than in the private sector,
allowing the possibility of differential
Gay pay 
in the UK
Has recent anti-discrimination legislation made
a difference to the pay and employment
prospects of gay men and lesbian women in the
UK? Reza Arabsheibani, Alan Marin and
Jonathan Wadsworth investigate.
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Gay men in couples earn
6% less than comparable
heterosexual men and are
less likely to be in work
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The raw data show that gay couples
are typically younger, more educated and
more likely to live in London than
heterosexual couples. But we can control
for any differences in pay and employment
that may be caused by such differences in
age, education, race and health as well as
differences in regional settlement patterns,
occupation or industrial affiliation. If, for
example, lesbian and gay individuals make
different investments in career paths, then
we need to account for such differences
that could otherwise show up as
differential wage or employment rates.
To test whether the anti-discrimination
law had a discernable impact on the pay
and employment of homosexual couples,
we simply compare the change in their
employment and pay levels relative to
heterosexual couples over the period
before and after the legislation.
Heterosexual couples will not have been
directly affected by this law and so their
pay and employment changes over this
period can serve as benchmarks. By
comparing changes for same sex couples
against these benchmarks, we can
determine whether or not the legislation
had any effect.
Table 1 shows the percentage
differences in hourly pay between
homosexual and heterosexual couples.
Gay men living in a couple earn, on
average, around 1% less than
heterosexual men in a couple, not
accounting for any differences in
effects across the two sectors. And 
lesbian and gay individuals may locate in
parts of the country that are perceived to
be more tolerant. 
The size of the homosexual population
relative to the number of non-
discriminatory employers could also have
an effect on wage and employment rates.
The smaller the size of the minority group,
the easier it may be to find non-
discriminatory employers, though a smaller
minority group may find it harder to have
an effective voice.
We can start to explore these issues by
measuring the extent of differences in pay
and employment across different groups.
This goal is immediately confronted by the
shortage of data on sexual orientation.
Fortunately the Labour Force Survey 
has, since 1996, collected information on
the subset of homosexual individuals who
live together.
The survey categorises people
according to whether they are married
and living with their spouse. Those who
do not belong to this group are then
asked whether they are living with
someone as a couple and, if so, whether
they are in a same sex couple. These same
sex couples comprise just 0.2% of the
adult working age population.
This method of identifying the
homosexual population is not perfect as it
does not include those who are married
and living with an opposite sex partner or
those who do not live with a partner,
whether they have one or not. Moreover,
it does not include those who live with a
same sex partner but do not reveal it in
the survey. There is also no information to
distinguish between gays, bisexuals or
other sexual minority groups.
Although these exclusions may bias
the applicability of our results to the entire
gay population, by comparing the sample
population to an appropriate sample
group of non-gays, we can reduce any
‘composition bias’. For this reason, we
compare the labour market outcomes of
homosexuals in our sample with the set of
heterosexual couples, both married and
unmarried, living together between
January 2001 and August 2005.
This gives us 35 months of
observations before the law came in and
21 months after, periods that are not too
long to be affected by other changes and
not too short to prevent any relevant
changes showing up.
Table 1:
Pay and employment of individuals in homosexual couples by
personal, location and job characteristics
Men
Same sex relative to heterosexual before anti-discrimination legislation
-1 -6 -5 -8 -7 +3 -3 -2 -4 -3
Change in gap after law 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Women
Same sex relative to heterosexual before anti-discrimination legislation
+35 +11 +14 +9 +6 +15 +12 +13 +12 +12
Change in gap after law 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
No 
controls
Controls Non-
graduate
Aged 40 
or 
younger
Employed
in the
private 
sector
No 
controls
Controls Non-
graduate
Aged 40 
or 
younger
Outside
London
Hourly wage gaps (percentage) Employment gaps (percentage points)
Lesbian women in
couples are paid 11%
more than comparable
heterosexual women and
are considerably more
likely to be in work
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characteristics. In contrast, lesbian women
in couples earn around 35% more than
heterosexual women in couples.
In the period after the legislation was
introduced, there was no significant
change in these differentials. So on this
basis it would seem that the law had
little effect on observable outcomes. We
then check to see how robust these
differentials are to the addition of
controls for observable differences
between the gay and heterosexual
groups in a set of variables also known to
influence wage levels.
For example, since there are more
graduates among lesbian women than
among heterosexual women, this could
help explain why there appears to be a
large pay premium for women in a 
same sex couple. Part of the estimated
‘gay effect’ would be picking up the
‘graduate effect’.
As Table 1 shows, adding controls for
age, education, region, occupation and
industry shows that the positive pay
premium for lesbian women is much
reduced but still positive at 11%. But
there is still little change in the period
after the legislation. For gay men,
controlling for differences in characteristics
makes the negative pay penalty larger at
around 6%. So for the same observed
characteristics, gay men appear to be paid
less than their heterosexual peers.
Since the legislation may have helped
disadvantaged groups of homosexual
workers more, we split the data into
groups that could be more at risk of
discrimination, namely non-graduates,
younger workers and those working in the
private sector. This shows that the pay
gaps for non-graduates are similar to the
total figure, but the pay penalty for
younger gay men is larger and the pay
premium for younger lesbian women and
those working in the private sector is much
lower. But there are still no changes in the
pay differentials after the law came in.
Since discrimination can be manifested
in hiring rates as well as wages, it may be
that there are differences in employment
rates for the homosexual couples or
different sub-groups. It is possible that the
results for wage rates are, in part,
influenced by ‘selectivity’ – differential
employment probabilities mean the
unobserved characteristics of those in
work could differ between the
homosexual and heterosexual couples. 
The raw employment rate differentials
in Table 1 suggest that gay men and
lesbian women are more likely to be in
work than heterosexual couples. But
controlling for differences in characteristics
suggests that gay men are less likely to be
in employment than heterosexual men,
and that the employment premium for
women is reduced substantially. There is
rather less heterogeneity in the same sex
employment gaps across different sub-
groups than there is in pay. But once
again, we find no discernable changes in
any of these gaps after the anti-
discrimination legislation. 
So more than two years after the
introduction of anti-discrimination
legislation, gay men appear to be 
paid around 6% less than their
heterosexual counterparts with similar
observed characteristics and are three
percentage points less likely to be in
work. Lesbian women, however, appear
to be paid around 11% more than
heterosexual women living in a couple
and are 12 percentage points more likely
to be in work.
Differentials of this magnitude could
be observed before the legislation took
hold and it is hard to conclude that the
legislation has had much effect on these
outcomes, though it may of course have
other effects in the workplace.
The average pay differentials do
conceal much variation across age groups,
education, regions and sectors of the
economy. Whether these differentials
reflect different discriminatory practices in
different regions, in different sectors or
across different sub-groups within the
minority population is a moot point,
though again it is hard to discern a
differential effect of anti-discrimination
legislation across these groups.
This article summarises ‘Variations in Gay
Pay in the UK and USA’ by Reza
Arabsheibani, Alan Marin and Jonathan
Wadsworth, forthcoming in Sexual
Orientation Discrimination: An International
Perspective edited by Lee Badgett and Jeff
Frank (Routledge). A good source of
information on the employment rights of
lesbian, gay and bisexual workers is the
Stonewall website
(http://www.stonewall.org.uk).
Reza Arabsheibani is at the University of
Wales, Swansea. Alan Marin is at LSE.
Jonathan Wadsworth is at Royal Holloway
College, University of London and a senior
research fellow in CEP’s labour markets
programme.
Gay couples
are typically
younger,
more
educated and
more likely 
to live in
London than
heterosexual
couples
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Companies that are bigger, more globalised and better
managed provide a better work-life balance for their
employees, according to the evidence of our research.
What’s more, tough product market competition
improves management practices but without any
detrimental impact on work-life balance.
At the same time, we find no evidence that firms with
good practices on work-life balance – shorter hours,
flexible working, family-friendly policies, etc. – have
higher productivity once we control for better
management in general. 
Our study uses an innovative survey tool on over 700
manufacturing firms in France, Germany, the UK and the
United States to ask questions about management
practices and work-life balance. We find that: 
■ Well-managed firms do not work ‘harder’ but ‘smarter’
– employees in well-run firms typically have a better
work-life balance.
■ In particular, management practices associated with
good ‘people management’ – such as fostering talent,
rewarding and retaining well performing staff and
providing consistent training opportunities – are likely
to work in conjunction with good work-life balance
practices – family-friendly policies, flexible working,
shorter hours, more holidays, childcare subsidies, etc.
■ In well-managed firms, the hours worked by both
managerial and non-managerial staff are not
significantly higher than those in badly run firms. This
again confirms the finding that working smarter not
harder is the key determinant to successful
management.
■ The share of women in management relative to non-
management is significantly higher in firms with better
work-life balance. In other words, the ‘glass ceiling’
does not seem to exist nearly as strongly in firms that
treat their employees well.
We describe two opposing views on the effects and
efficacy of good management practices on work-life
balance – the pessimistic ‘trade-off’ view and the
optimistic ‘win-win’ view:
■ The trade-off view is that ‘Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism’,
encapsulated by tougher product market competition
and globalisation has undesirable consequences.
Although these forces raise productivity, they come at
the expense of misery for workers in the form of long
hours, job insecurity and intense and unsatisfying
work.
■ The win-win view argues that better work-life balance
will improve productivity and employers are mistakenly
failing to treat their workers as assets and implement
better work-life balance practices.
This study finds evidence for a hybrid view between these
two polar extremes (see Figure 1 and Table 1):
■ The evidence does not support the trade-off view:
there is, in fact, a positive association between good
management and work-life balance. Similarly, the view
that competition and globalisation are bad for work-
life balance is not supported: there is no relationship
Work-life balance:
the links with management
practices and productivity
in brief...
Employees in larger, more globalised
firms seem to be much better 
off in terms of their working lives
Does good management and higher
productivity come at the expense of
work-life balance? Or is good work-life
balance an important component of the
management of successful firms? New
research by Nick Bloom, Tobias
Kretschmer and John Van Reenen
finds evidence for a hybrid view
between these two polar extremes.
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between tougher competition and work-life balance.
And larger firms – which are typically more globalised –
also have better work-life balance practices.
■ But the win-win view that better work-life balance will
improve productivity is also rejected: there is no
relationship between productivity and work-life balance
once good management is accounted for.
■ Instead, well-managed firms can choose to introduce
better work-life balance practices or not. 
If they do introduce them, this neither penalises them
in terms of productivity nor does it significantly 
reward them.
Based on these results, it simply is not true that
globalisation is such a disaster for employees. Employees
in larger, more globalised firms seem to be much better
off in terms of their working lives than those in smaller,
more national firms.
This conclusion suggests that improving work-life balance
is socially desirable – workers obviously like it and firm
productivity does not suffer. For firms, this will be worth
weighing up more seriously. Most of the best-run firms in
our sample treated their employees very well.
But we also need to be cautious before inferring that the
results give a carte blanche for governments to regulate
for better work-life balance. Good work-life balance
seems to be something that well-run firms in competitive
markets do naturally. They need to treat their employees
well to keep them – if not, their competitors will hire
them away. Government policies on work-life balance
should take this into account.
This article summarises ‘Work-Life Balance,
Management Practices and Productivity’ by Nick Bloom,
Tobias Kretschmer and John Van Reenen
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/management/worklifebalance_research.pdf).
Nick Bloom is assistant professor of economics at Stanford
University and director of CEP’s research programme on
productivity and innovation. Tobias Kretschmer is a research
associate in the programme and a lecturer in strategy and
economics at LSE’s Interdisciplinary Institute of Management.
John Van Reenen is director of CEP and professor of
economics at LSE.
The research is financially supported by the Anglo-German
Foundation, the Economic and Social Research Council and
the Advanced Institute for Management Research.
Competition Good management
High
productivity
Work-life 
balance
+
+
?
Figure 1:
Hybrid view of competition, management and work-life balance
Table 1:
Correlations predicted by the different theories 
Theories  
Correlation of work-life balance and: Trade-off Win-Win Hybrid
Competition Negative Ambiguous Ambiguous
Management Negative Positive Ambiguous
Productivity Negative Positive Zero
Good work-life
balance seems to be
something that
well-run firms in
competitive markets
do naturally
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Child labour in 1920 
urban America
Most of us will be enraged by seeing children in poorer
countries at work in the fields, selling goods on the street
or simply helping out their parents in the family shop. One
imagines, perhaps rightly, that these children are
condemned to a lifetime of poverty because of their lack
of access to education and the permanent scars from
working at an early age. Because of this, many people
would advocate policies banning child labour and
establishing compulsory school attendance.
Economists are rather more cautious about such
conclusions. Yes, child labour is obviously bad but what is
the alternative for these children? If they were forced to
attend school rather than going to work, would they or
their families be unequivocally better off?
Some amount of child labour might allow a child or his
siblings to afford an education or satisfy basic feeding
needs, in which case a ban on child labour would not
necessarily be desirable. Perhaps instead, it is parents who
might work more to sustain their children in school, which
would provide some justification for public policy
intervention.
My research explores these issues, in particular analysing
the impact of working children on their parents’ work and
their siblings’ work and education. 
Assessing empirically how parents and siblings respond to
a child working is easier said than done. Both parents and
siblings from poorer families will presumably be more
likely to work. Hence, one will find a positive correlation
between parents' and children's labour, which would be
hard to interpret as the ‘causal effect’ of child labour on
household labour supply. 
The solution devised in this paper is to look at the impact
of child labour laws in 1920 urban America. What makes
this worth studying is that the minimum working age
varied across US states: some states imposed an age as
low as 12 while others prevented children younger than
16 from working. This provides the opportunity for a
‘natural experiment’.
My research shows that the laws had an impact. Analysis
of data from the 1920 US census shows that a child
sufficiently old to work in his state of residence tended to
work more than a child of the same age living in a
different state where he was not allowed to work.
To check that this difference does not reflect unobserved
differences across states in children's work opportunities
or their need to work – both of which might in turn
explain a lower legal working age – I compare this
difference to the difference in participation between a pair
of younger children living in the two states who are both
not allowed to work. 
I then compare the difference in employment of the
parents of the first pair of children relative to the
difference in the second pair. I attribute this ‘difference in
difference’ in participation to the effect of the differential
eligibility for work of these adults' children. Using this
strategy, I find no statistically significant evidence of
parents working less in response to their children entering
the labour market.
To infer the effect of child labour on siblings' work and
school participation, I use a slightly different strategy. The
idea here is to compare the effect of a child being eligible
for work on both his own probability of work and the
probability of work of a child chosen at random from his
household (the child himself or one of his siblings). If the
second effect is smaller, it implies that when a child works
in brief...
When poor children are working rather than going to school, do
their parents work less? And what happens to their siblings?
Marco Manacorda looks for answers in the experience of child
labour in urban America at the dawn of the jazz age.
It seems to be extreme poverty
rather than parental exploitation
that lies behind child labour
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more, his siblings respond by working less. Indeed, this is
what happened: the response to a child becoming eligible
for work was for his siblings to work less and be more
likely to attend school.
What do we learn from this analysis? Parents do not
appear to adjust their work effort in response to their
children's change in labour market participation. This is
consistent with the notion that parents of working
children cannot possibly work more than they actually do.
If one accepts this interpretation, it seems to be extreme
poverty rather than parental exploitation that lies behind
child labour.
A second and potentially more novel result is that the
siblings of working children appear to benefit from one
child in the household working in terms of increased
school attendance and reduced labour. This raises
concerns about the distribution of work and school across
children within the same households: it appears that the
costs of sending some children to school in poor families
are borne in part by their working siblings.
This article summarises ‘Child Labour and
the Labour Supply of Other Household
Members: Evidence from 1920 America’ 
by Marco Manacorda, CEP Discussion 
Paper No. 590
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0590.pdf) and forthcoming in the American
Economic Review.
Marco Manacorda is at Queen Mary,
University of London and a research
associate in CEP’s labour markets
programme.
Image: Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs 
Division, National Child Labor Committee Collection,
[reproduction number, LC-DIG-nclc-00744]
The costs of sending some children 
to school in poor families are borne 
in part by their working siblings
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to negotiate collective contracts and 
to be involved in the detail of payment
systems. By contrast, the unions in our
three cases played, at best, a peripheral
role in such matters.
Chinese labour law now encourages
unions to sign and perhaps bargain
collectively to negotiate collective
contracts. Both Pig Farm and Coconut
Palm said that they do have such collective
contracts but not as a result of negotiation
with the grass roots union branch. Rather,
the contracts set out the minimum
standards in matters like minimum wages,
working time and safety as required by
national and local law. Such collective
contracts were referred to derisorily by
management at Coconut Palm as simply
setting out ‘themes’ but having no real
content. Tinplate simply dismissed the
notion of collective contracts.
Instead, all three companies
emphasised the importance of individual
contracts. Pig Farm uses the model
individual contract issued by the labour
bureau in Haikou City (the capital of
Hainan Province) but with its own
amendments. This contract is re-signed
every five years. At Tinplate, the individual
contract is for one year. We were told that
this short duration is a deliberate stick to
elicit effort: ‘we could provide three- or
T
rade unions in China
have many members:
137 million according to
the official figure from
the All China Federation
of Trade Unions (ACFTU)
as indicated in Figure 1. But they are
virtually impotent when it comes to
representing workers.
Because the Chinese party-state
recognises that such frailty may lead to
instability, it has passed labour laws
promoting collective contracts and
established tripartite institutions to
mediate in individual disputes. But while
these new laws and institutions are
welcome, they are largely hollow.
Collective contracts are very different 
from collective bargaining and the
incidence of cases dealt with by tripartite
institutions is tiny.
Although China does not have
properly functioning unions, it is worth
remembering that the whole notion of a
‘labour market’ is only a decade or so old,
reflecting the previous Marxist aversion to
exchanging labour for money.
Since the 1994 Labour Law, which
introduced labour contracts, the labour
market has become firmly established in
China. But there is no evidence
whatsoever of a parallel development in
functioning unions. The inability of
workers to develop proper representation
for their common interests, coupled with
the rapid spread and deepening of the
market mechanisms, implies that despite
their huge membership, unions are likely
to remain largely nugatory in Chinese
labour relations. 
In detailed case studies conducted in
2004 and 2005, we looked at three
companies in Hainan Province: a joint
venture producing tinplate; the largest
coconut juice producer in the world; and a
listed pig farm conglomerate. In all three
companies, unions are a sideshow in terms
of ‘voice’ and dispute resolution. At
Tinplate, for example, voice arrangements
are entirely via frequent direct meetings
between management and workers, and
the union chair is the top sales manager.
We were told the union ‘is only for
show… irrelevant… just organises sport
and entertainment… will soon fade away’.
At Coconut Palm, which is employee-
owned, it is the shareholders committee
that filters management decisions. These
are then validated by the workers
congress, a sort of works council and a
hangover from when the company was
state-owned. The union ‘just plays a
welfare role’.
In the West, a major role for unions is
China apparently has more trade union
members than the rest of the world put
together. But as David Metcalf and Jianwei Li
have found, Chinese unions function very
differently from unions in the West.
Trade unions 
in hina 
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two-year contracts but the one-year
contract yields more discipline’.
The reason that individual contracts
are paramount is not hard to find. All
three companies have powerful versions of
performance-related pay. Our evidence
mirrors the remarkable change from the
traditional system of an egalitarian, 
non-performance related pay system
towards company, team and individual
performance pay with a low base
component. In the three companies, these
systems were devised and implemented by
management with no real input from
unions or workers.
Pig Farm sets team-level production
targets with severe penalties for missing
the target and generous rewards for
exceeding it. Tinplate has a company-wide
performance-based system such that, on
average, production workers’ pay is
composed of a base amount of 40% and
an output-related amount of 60%. More
importantly, there is an ‘inverse
tournament’: each worker is given a
rigorous annual performance appraisal and
the worker with the lowest rating is
automatically dismissed.
At Coconut Palm, the performance
pay system uses salary, bonus, dividends
and fines. Quality control is achieved by
teams monitoring the output quality of
the previous team on the assembly line. 
A defective can would, for example, result
in a fine of more than one day’s pay.
Managers and union officials emphasised
that when this system was introduced in
the 1990s, many workers left because
they could not cope with the risk sharing
and extra effort required.
In her stunning family history Wild
Swans, Jung Chan notes that during the
famine (1959-61), ‘telling fantasies to
oneself as well as others, and believing
them, was practised to an incredible
degree… “self-deception while deceiving
others” gripped the nation’. If we turn the
clock forward almost half a century,
unions inhabit a similar dream world.
The plain fact is that Chinese unions
are feeble. Thriving unions need, initially at
least, some common interest among
workers to flower. This has not developed,
and is unlikely to evolve for a number of
reasons:
■ First, the basic union unit is the
workplace or enterprise, which makes it
difficult to develop the rallying cry of
Figure 1:
Employment, union membership and 
union density in China, 2004
Employment (millions)
Total 752
Urban 265
Rural 487
Unions (millions)
Number of members 137.00
Number of grass roots union branches 1.02
Density
Membership as percentage of: 
Total employment 18.2%
Urban employment 51.7%
Chinese unions have many
members but are virtually
impotent when it comes 
to representing workers
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western unions for much of the late
nineteenth and twentieth century – ‘the
rate for the job’ or ‘common rule’.
■ Second, the party-state does 
not recognise any conflict between
capital and labour.
■ Third, even if class consciousness is
enhanced – by, for example, the
dreadful and worsening safety record (in
2002, workplace accidents caused
140,000 deaths and 250,000 workers
lost body parts and suffered other
injuries), growing wage and income
inequality and the exploitation of
workers, particularly by foreign-invested
firms – any manifestations of common
interests are likely to be suppressed by
the party-state.
■ Fourth, even the ACFTU’s top officials
consider the members to be entirely
separate from ‘the union’. ACFTU
chairman Wang Zhaoguo has said that
Chinese unions must ‘forge closer links
with workers’ and ‘consistently keep
close ties with the masses of workers as
the lifeline of trade union work’. Such
statements confirm that members’
interests are presently a low priority. 
Furthermore, the spread of the market
mechanism to product and labour markets
means that, whatever the law says, many
firms do not wish to treat with unions.
Under the market system, unions can
thrive either if they can impose costs on
the employer or if they can demonstrably
provide benefits by boosting the efficiency
of the enterprise. Unions are incapable of
imposing costs and all the evidence
suggests that managers in the growing
non-state-owned segment of the economy
believe that the efficiency of the enterprise
depends on their actions, utterly
independent of any unions’ role.
Thus, collective contracts and tripartite
institutions are treated with a shrug of the
shoulders – implemented because it is the
law but not embraced. And all the while
employees have a low priority. A 2004
survey of over 3,000 private sector
enterprises asked: ‘If you want to be a
good employer in the private sector, which
kind of good things would you like to
do?’ There were six items and the
employer could answer ‘yes’ to as many as
s/he liked. Only 29% said ‘yes’ to ‘treating
workers well’.
Unions will remain nugatory while
they rest content as a transmission belt
This article summarises ‘Chinese Unions:
Nugatory or Transforming? An Alice Analysis’
by David Metcalf and Jianwei Li, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 708
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0708.pdf) and forthcoming in Advances 
in Industrial and Labor Relations.
David Metcalf is professor of industrial
relations at LSE and a research associate in
CEP’s labour markets programme.
Jianwei Li is a member of the Haikou City
foreign affairs ministry and was a CEP
research assistant 2003/4.
Many
Chinese
companies
now use
powerful
versions of
performance-
related pay
such that they convey government policies
to workers and enforce labour discipline to
promote those policies, as opposed to
representing workers in dealing with
employers and the government.
Real wages have trebled in China in
the last 20 years. But collective action by
unions is utterly irrelevant to this huge
advance in workers’ well-being, which
simply mirrors the very rapid growth of
productivity. On the other hand,
representation, voice, greater safety and a
tempering of exploitation surely do require
both collective action and autonomous
organisation.
If the Chinese government wants the
unions to provide an effective safety valve,
then it has to allow them a degree of
independence and permit, if not
encourage, them to play a representative
role. But the 2003 ACFTU Congress
marked a major setback for progressive
union developments, with the installation
of a more conservative leadership.
The need for more effective collective
representation is recognised by far-seeing
albeit cautious ACFTU officials. Their 2004
report for the World Bank concluded with
what is, in effect, a manifesto for reform,
including the need to help workers
develop their collective interests because
unions are ‘the weakest ring’ in the
labour market; autonomous negotiations
and the right to strike; and a much
stronger labour inspectorate, to cover
social security payments, labour contracts
and collective agreements (though not
safety). But such reasonable reforms do
seem a long way off.
CentrePiece Summer 2006
27
Cycles of disadvantage
The fact that roughly 3.4 million children – or 27% of 
the child population – are living in poverty is a critical
policy issue. Much has been made of the government’s
commitment to reducing child poverty, particularly 
its first target of a 25% fall in the numbers in poverty
between 1998/99 and 2004/05, which has just been
narrowly missed.
This concern about child poverty relates not just to the
immediate effects of poverty. More importantly, the
experience of poverty in childhood may influence social,
economic and health outcomes throughout later life,
leading to the ‘persistence’ of poverty into adulthood and
consequences for the next generation.
In order to investigate the long-term impact of growing
up in poverty, we need to observe children’s family
circumstances and then return to see how they are doing
later in life. Such information can be found in the two
British cohort studies: the National Child Development
Study and the British Cohort Study. The availability of
these two data sources – one a cohort born in 1958, the
other a cohort born in 1970 – allows us to compare the
fortunes of people who were teenagers in the 1970s and
the 1980s.
Our initial estimates of the persistence of poverty
compare the poverty rates of people in their early thirties
between those who grew up in poverty and those who
did not:
■ Of people whose families were poor when they were
16 in the 1970s, 19% were poor in their early thirties
and 81% were not. So the ‘odds’ against growing 
up to be poor if your parents were poor were over
four-to-one.
■ Of people whose families were not poor when they
were 16 in the 1970s, 90% were not poor in their
early thirties while 10% were poor. So the ‘odds’
against growing up to be poor if your parents were not
poor were about nine-to-one.
Persistence of poverty can be measured by dividing the
odds of being poor if one's parents were poor by the
odds of being poor if they were not – a number called
the ‘odds ratio’.
Calculations of this odds ratio show that for a teenager in
the 1970s, the odds of being poor as an adult were
doubled if his or her parents were poor. Similar
calculations for the later cohort who were teenagers in
the 1980s show that the odds of being poor in
adulthood were nearly quadrupled by having poor
parents (see Figure 1). Comparing these odds across the
cohorts indicates that the strength of poverty persistence
has approximately doubled, with an increase for men that
is slightly greater than for women. 
For teenagers growing up in the 1970s, teenage poverty
doubled the odds of being poor at age 33. For this older
cohort, it is also possible to observe their situations at age
42. The impact of teenage poverty on poverty at age 42
is very similar to its impact at age 33, also doubling the
chances of being poor. For this group, teenage poverty is
therefore as strongly related to middle-age poverty as to
poverty in earlier adulthood.
This is perhaps surprising: we might expect the influence
of teenage poverty to fade as the years go by. One
explanation could be that teenage poverty influences
poverty in early adulthood, and this then links through to
poverty in later life. But accounting for poverty at age 33
has very little impact on the odds ratios for poverty at
age 42. The link between poverty in teenhood and
adulthood continues through to middle age, regardless of
whether or not an individual is recorded as poor in their
thirties. 
These results raise an important policy question: what is it
about growing up in poverty that makes it more likely
that poor children will experience disadvantage in later
life? This is crucial in terms of putting in place effective
policies to alleviate the effects of early disadvantage. For
example, if we can show that it is lack of money in itself
Growing up in poverty makes it more likely that
children will be poor in later life
in brief...
More than a quarter of Britain’s children are growing up in poverty.
New research by Jo Blanden and Steve Gibbons measures the extent to
which children’s experience of relative financial hardship increases their
chances of being poor in adulthood – and whether that ‘persistence’ of
poverty across generations has got worse.
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that is causing children to do badly, then redistribution is
an obvious solution and reducing child poverty through
benefits will have important effects.
We know that poor families differ in many ways from
those who are not poor: they are more likely to be headed
by lone parents and/or parents with low education and
employment. Policy prescriptions are more difficult if it is
these factors that lead to disadvantageous outcomes for
children, as they are much less subject to change. The
cohort studies include information on family characteristics,
which makes it possible to measure the extent to which
they are connected with poverty in later life:
■ For the teenagers growing up in the 1970s, it seems
that the impact of these factors on children can explain
all of the higher later poverty rates for children who
experienced poverty as teenagers. It was their family
characteristics, in particular their parents’ lack of
education and work, that resulted in their later poverty
and not the fact that their parents lacked income per se.
■ For those who were teenagers in the 1980s, this is not
the case: even when taking account of their family
characteristics, there is evidence that poverty in itself
puts these young people at a significant disadvantage. 
These results could be taken to imply that straightforward
redistribution would have had substantial benefits for the
younger group. But this conclusion is too simplistic as it
does not take account of the ways in which poor and
non-poor families differ that are difficult to observe. 
For example, we do not have a measure of parents’
ability to help and encourage their children to learn and
persevere. Evidence from other studies suggests that
policies to reduce child poverty through transfers must be
coupled with policies that help children’s learning and
development, particularly at early ages. 
The most striking finding from this research is that the
persistence of poverty from the teens into the early
thirties has risen over time, with teenage poverty having
a greater impact on later outcomes for teenagers in the
1980s compared with teenagers in the 1970s. This
finding adds to the wider evidence that family
background has had a growing impact on later outcomes
between these cohorts. 
This article summarises The Persistence 
of Poverty across Generations: A View from
two British Cohorts by Jo Blanden and 
Steve Gibbons, published for the Joseph
Rowntree Foundation by The Policy Press
(http://www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/
details.asp?pubID=778).
Jo Blanden is a lecturer in economics at the
University of Surrey. Steve Gibbons is a
lecturer in economic geography at LSE. Both
are research associates in CEP’s education
and skills programme.
Teenagers who lived
in poverty in the
1980s are twice as
likely to be poor in
adulthood as their
1970s counterparts
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Figure 1:
How teenage poverty affects the odds
of being poor as an adult
Note: The bars report the odds ratios
for poverty at 16 in a logit model of
poverty at age 33 for the earlier cohort
and age 30 for the later cohort.
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